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Kenya's Cautious 
Development Plan 
BY JUDITH HEYER, 
Research Fellow, Institute 
For Development Studies, 
University College Nairobi. 
THE major economic objectives of post-independence development plans in Africa are usually to accelerate the rate of 
growth in the economy through a greater 
mobilisation of resources which have not been 
fully extended during the colonial period, and 
the co-ordination of development projects, 
getting priorities established from a national 
point of view. They mark a new pre-occupation 
with the greatest possible level of economic 
growth, to raise the living standards of the 
people. 
The fuller mobilisation of resources is pro-
moted by a development plan in several ways. A 
plan can be used to inspire people to put in 
greater efforts and to make greater sacrifices 
for the achievement of the plan targets. A 
plan can stimulate increased activitiy, with 
government putting more emphasis on econo-
mic growth. A plan can be important in en-
couraging investment, by increasing confidence 
and reducing uncertainty where the private 
sector is concerned. And a plan can help to 
attract more foreign aid, which is often easier 
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to negotiate for a country with a sound eco-
nomic plan. In addition to all these general 
ways in which a plan helps to increase the use 
of available resources, a plan makes specific 
proposals to this end. 
The co-ordination of projects into an inte-
grated economic plan also contributes to an 
increasing rate of growth. Co-ordination is often 
particularly necessary within government, 
and a strong planning unit can undoubtedly 
have an important influence in getting 
priorities decided at a national rather than a 
ministerial level, and in getting the individual 
ministries to use economic criteria when draw-
ing up their separate plans. The necessity to 
produce well-documented proposals for scrutiny 
by a planning unit may encourage the collection 
of more useful statistics in future as well. In 
the private sector, the mere listing of priori-
ties can help to get development coordinated, 
though other economic policy instruments can 
be equally successful in getting the private 
sector to make the desired contribution to a 
national plan. 
The revised Kenya Development Plan (1) 
supercedes the Development Plan 1964-70, (2) 
which was hurriedly put together as a general 
guide until a fuller plan could be written, (see 
pages 4-5, old plan). The new plan is a lengthy 
document, not because it provides a wealth 
of detail on the individual projects, but be-
cause there are many introductory statements 
of general principles, presumably included to 
promote a wider understanding of the develop-
ment process; there is a good deal of repeti-
tion; and there are several descriptive and 
statistical sections on the performance of the 
economy in the recent past, which will be 
useful for those who do not have ready access 
to other government publications. 
The plan shows most concern for co-ordina-
tion within Government, and while it outlines 
priorities for the private seotor as well, there 
is little to say how the private sector will be 
1. Development Plan 1966-1970, Kenya Govern-
ment, 1966. Referred to in the text as "the 
new plan". 
2. Development Plan 1964-1970,Kenya Govern-
ment, 1964. See also D. P. Ghai: "How 
Good is Kenya's Plan?", East Africa 
Journal, July 1964. 
encouraged to fall in with these. The plan 
is realistic rather than ambitious in its overall 
targets, and while this may help in getting 
foreign aid and private investment, it is argu-
able that it is too modest to inspire a greatly 
increased national effort. 
There is a marked difference in approach 
to planning between Kenya on the one hand 
and Tanzania and Uganda on the other. Both 
Uganda (3) and Tanzania have long-term 
plans, setting overall targets for 15 years, 
while concentrating on a detailed 5 year plan 
for the immediate future. Kenya makes no 
attempt to set long-term targets, and further-
more the Kenya plan puts more emphasis on 
revision and flexibility than the Uganda or 
Tanzania plans. The Kenya plan shows an 
encouraging concern for the implementation 
stage of the planning process, as well as the 
initial planning stage. 
The most striking difference between the 
new and the old Kenya plans is in the rate 
of growth of monetary Gross Domestic Pro-
duct (GDP) that is projected. The new plan 
proposes an annual rate of 7.1 per cent com-
pared with the old plan's rate of 5.7 per cent. 
The growth rate achieved in Kenya from 1954 
to 1959 was 7.5 per cent and although this 
slowed down considerably from 1959 to 1964, 
it does not seem unduly optimistic to aim for 
7.1 per cent again now. Taking monetary and 
non-monetary GDP together, the overall rate 
of growth expected is 6.3 per cent which is 
identical to that of the new Uganda plan, but 
somewhat less than Tanzania's 6.7 per cent. 
The level of investment needed to sustain 
this rate of growth is estimated at £325 million 
over the plan period, increasing from £35 
million in 1964 to £83 million in 1970. This 
means that fixed capital formation will increase 
from 11.6 to 19.1 per cent of the GDP. Fixed 
capital formation averaged 22 per cent of the 
GDP from 1954 to 1959, reaching 24 per cent 
in 1955 and 1956, and it was only from 1959 
to 1964 that it fell to the very levels from which 
it must now rise again. Here again the plan 
target does not seem over-optimistic. 
The share of investment coming from 
abroad is expected to rise from 2 to 32 per 
3. Uganda's Second Five-Year Plan 1966-1971, 
Uganda Government, 1966. 
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cent with the deliberate creation of a balance 
of payments deficit to accommodate this, and 
domestic savings are expected to increase from 
16.4 to 18.4 per cent of the GDP by 1970. 
Domestic savings are to be encouraged by a 
growth in savings institutions. Domestic 
finance is also to be increased by the substitu-
tion of domestic for foreign assets held by 
publicly controlled institutions, an increase 
in the fiduciary issue, and a small budget sur-
plus by 1970. The extent to which Kenya 
intends to use taxation to finance development 
is very small, £3 million over the period of 
the plan compared with Uganda's £30 million 
and Tanzania's £8.9 million. It is likely that 
Kenya will be able to draw on larger fiduciary 
issues and more private savings than Uganda 
or Tanzania, though. 
Over the plan period, Kenya hopes to get 
56 per cent of the capital required from abroad, 
partly through foreign aid, and partly through 
private investment. Tanzania, which was 
counting on 52 per cent is already having diffi-
culties in obtaining sufficient foreign capital 
but Kenya may be in a better position to attract 
outside funds. Of the £107 million of foreign 
aid expected in Kenya for the public sector, 
69 per cent is already committed or under 
negotiation. Of total investment, 55 per cent 
will be private and 45 per cent through the 
public sector. 
The bottle-necks in real rather than 
financial resources are expected to be a short-
age of skilled manpower and insufficient capa-
city in the construction industry. To these 
might be added the capacity of the transport 
system and in particular the port facilities at 
Mombasa. The plan recognises that difficulties 
with real resources may make it difficult to 
keep to the financial schedule, and there is 
some provision already in the plan for delays. 
The plan includes a government contribution 
of £200,000 for a national construction company, 
which is both to undertake construction on 
its own account, and to help in the setting 
up of more construction firms. There is a 
good deal of discussion of skilled manpower 
needs too. Paul Clark reminds us, writing 
about the shortage of skilled manpower: " . . . its 
effects are perhaps more likely to take the form 
of delays and mistakes by harrassed and inex-
perienced government officials administering 
development activities than the form of a 
general lack of suitable people to fill operator 
positions throughout the economy". (4) The 
educational programme in the plan does not 
appear to be sufficiently closely related to 
precise skilled manpower needs, particularly 
below the university level. 
A notable shortcoming of the Kenya plan 
is the lack of any overall feasibility tests, 
which could take the form of input-output 
tables, however crude, and also the lack of 
discussion of recurrent budget implications. 
Tanzania has already tried a table of econo-
mic equilibrium, and admittedly Tanzania is 
ahead of many other African countries in this 
respect, (5) but the availability of the relevant 
statistics in Kenya, together with the more 
complex interrelationships of the economy 
which make the exercise more worthwhile, 
would suggest that input-output calculations 
ought soon to be part of the planning process 
here. 
Over the period of the plan, the structure 
of the Kenya economy is not to be changed 
very much. Kenya is not aiming for a radical 
reconstruction at present. The continuing pre-
dominance of agriculture, and the lack of em-
phasis on industrial expansion is surprising, 
even though in Kenya the agricultural sector 
is relatively well-endowed and diversified. The 
subsistence sector is expected to grow at the 
same rate as the population, a somewhat pessi-
mistic assumption, and in the monetary GDP 
agriculture and livestock are expected to main-
tain their position, accounting for 16.5 per 
cent in 1970 as in 1964. Industry is expected 
to increase its share only from 10.4 to 11.5 
per cent. The rates of growth of these two 
sectors are almost the same as they were 
in the pre-independence economy 6.8 and 8.0 
per cent, which compares with the 1954 to 
1964 figures of 6.4 and 7.6 per cent. In 
Tanzania and Uganda, where agriculture is 
not so diversified as in Kenya, the role of 
agriculture is expected to show a substantial 
decrease. Kenya's other sectors all show re-
4. P. G. Claiit: Development Planning in East 
Africa Nairobi: East African Publishing 
House, 1965. 
5. R. H. Green: "Four Afrcan Development 
Plans," Journal of Modern African Studies, 
August 1965. 
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latively little change in their role in the mone-
tary economy, except the construction industry 
which is expected to increase its role substan-
tially from the depressed level of 1964. 
Of total expenditure, 41 per cent is to be 
spent on the productive sectors, 37 per cent 
•on infrastructure, and 19 per cent on social 
services. This compares with Tanzania's 36 
per cent, 30 per cent and 28 per cent. (Uganda's 
figures are not strictly comparable here). 
Kenya seems to be putting rather little em-
phasis on the development of social services 
compared with Tanzania. 
Perhaps the most serious failure of the 
plan is in respect of unemployment. The 
planners rightly feel that unemployment can 
only be dealt with within the framework of 
a rapidly developing economy, but within this 
framework there is a lot that can be done. The 
plan analysis that the economy is suffering 
from a lack of productive skills which makes 
labour expensive even at the low wage rates 
that exist is correct, but their remedies do 
not seem to go very far to alleviate the prob-
lem. 
The independent government inherited a 
serious unemployment problem, and recorded 
employment was almost exactly the same in 
1964 as it was in 1954. The growth of the 
economy between 1954 and 1964 had been 
achieved through the substitution -of capital for 
labour, leaving employment virtually unchang-
ed. The tax structure as well as the lack of 
cheap labour helped to encourage this, and 
there should be an immediate reversal to en-
courage the use of labour rather than capital 
in future, through taxation devices. Research 
into techniques of production that use relatively 
more labour and less capital is also suggested, 
and to this might be added a more serious 
move towards co-operation with other coun-
tries in Africa on this. All possible efforts 
should be made to encourage a more permanent 
labour force, and an effort should be made 
to relate the industrial training programmes 
to the maximisation of employment in future. 
In the longer-run family planning will help, 
but for the immediate future there will be 
rapidly increasing numbers of people to 
absorb. 
The plan makes little attempt to estimate 
the numbers of people at present unemployed. 
It is merely noted that no study has yet been 
undertaken in this area. One might go further 
and suggest the urgency of making a serious 
study of all aspects of the problem, which is 
probably Kenya's most serious political, social 
and economic problem today. The total em-
ployment likely to be created over the plan 
period outside peasant agriculture, with opti-
mistic assumptions, will not even absorb the 
increase in the male labour force, let alone 
contribute to a reduction in the numbers of 
unemployed. The plan provides for an increase 
of 340,000 jobs, outside peasant agriculture, 
but estimates the increase in the labour force 
which needs these jobs at 400,000. The balance 
is expected to be absorbed in the peasant 
agricultural sector, but here again virtually 
nothing is known about the opportunities, and 
until some serious study is done this can be 
no more than an optimistic hope. 
The plan is much better on Africanisation, 
which is also clearly a major political goal. 
The amount of resources diverted to the re-
distribution of ownership and participation in 
the economy rather than to any increase in 
production may seriously reduce the possibili-
ties of attaining more accelerated growth tar-
gets. In agriculture, £10.8 million out of a 
total of £38.4 million central government 
expenditure, is to be devoted to the trans-
fer of land from non-Africans to Africans 
and associated settlement scheme activi-
ties, expenditure which is not expected to 
lead to any substantial increases in production. 
The sum of £2.1 million will be spent on trans-
ferring large-scale farms to Africans intact, 
and £8.7 million will be spent on settlement 
schemes. Six thousand acres of mixed farm-
ing land have already been transferred to 
large-scale African farmers, and a further 
250,000 acres is to be transferred during the 
plan period. There is also provision for the 
training of African large-scale farmers. One 
million acres of land has now been transferred 
to small-scale farmers on settlement schemes, 
and during the plan period there will be a 
further 100,000 acres only transferred in this 
way, but considerable expenditures will still 
be necessary to make the existing schemes 
work. (In the old Kenya plan considerably 
more future settlement was projected). Agri-
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cultural development funds are to be allocated 
in increasing proportions to the African areas 
in future as well. 
Commerce is rightly seen as a sphere 
where Africanisation is particularly important. 
Although numerically Africans are already 
strongly represented in commerce, the strategic 
commercial businesses still remain in non-
African hands. The policy for commerce is 
almost entirely a policy for Africanisation, 
rather than development of the sector as a 
whole, and it includes the provision of exten-
sion services and training facilities, as pre-
requisites for financial assistance which will 
in future only be given to those who are com-
petent to use it well. This is a good order 
of priorities, and it is to be hoped that the 
training and extension services will keep far 
enough ahead of the new loans programme 
for these principles to be followed. 
The policy for industry includes a good 
deal of encouragement of Africanisation, but 
the overall policy is necessarily one of expan-
sion of the sector as a whole. Enterprises re-
quiring high-level skills will be encouraged to 
provide for rapid training of Africans to fill 
the high-level posts; there will be various 
training advisory bodies to equip Africans with 
managerial and entrepreneurial skills, as well 
as technical skills required in industry; and 
increasing opportunities will be given to Afri-
can construction enterprises through the Na-
tional Construction Company. 
There is little mention of the transport 
industry which is a particularly suitable area 
for Africanisation, but perhaps this is to come 
under the programme for commerce already 
discussed. 
Several general criteria are given for 
choosing between different projects in the dif-
ferent sectors, but it seems that as yet little 
detailed project analysis has been done. The 
dangers of accepting foreign aid for projects 
that do not appear high in the list of priorities 
are expounded, but it is never very clear how 
projects are ranked and how carefully they 
are assessed for acceptance or rejection in the 
plan. Government is expected to give consi-
derable assistance to private sector projects, 
and there are numerous competing possibilities 
in the field of normal government activities 
as well. It is important to develop reliable 
ways of assessing the relative merits of differ-
ent projects, and of deciding on priorities. This 
is as important in the industrial as in the 
agricultural sphere. 
Government is to promote and encourage 
industrial expansion through financial partici-
pation in particular projects, through customs 
protection in the early stages, through tax 
concessions, and through guarantees. A major 
proportion of public funds allocated to the 
industrial sector is for the setting up of indus-
trial estates in Nairobi, Eldoret, Nakuru and 
Mombasa. In general the private sector is ex-
pected to provide the initiative, though Govern-
ment will prepare some feasibility studies of 
industrial projects in which private investors 
may be interested. The management and most 
of the finance for industry will also come from 
the private sector. There is some conflict be-
tween the maximum encouragement for private 
investment, and hence maximum profits, and 
a fair share for the employees, the consumers, 
and Government, which is not really resolved 
in the plan. 
Agriculture as usual, contains the most 
detailed and advanced planning, (6) but there 
is a surprisingly heavy emphasis on produc-
tion and a corresponding neglect of marketing 
activities here. Agricultural marketing is 
normally accepted as an important bottle-neck 
in developing countries, and Kenya has special 
problems with her national marketing organi-
sations as well. With a serious crisis of con-
fidence in the marketing of maize during the 
shortage last year, and the major inquiry 
that followed, it is disappointing to see the 
plan giving no indications on the future of 
the marketing boards. While being critical 
of co-operatives, it provides little constructive 
planning for these, and there is virtually no 
mention of the marketing of agricultural pro-
duce at the lower levels outside the co-operative 
area. 
In production, there is to be an increasing 
emphasis on the former African areas, and 
a large proportion of funds allocated to these 
is to be spent on land consolidation. (7) This 
6. Also noted by D. P. Ghai, op. cit. 
7. "Land consolidation" includes both the 
consolidation of fragments and the registra-
tion of title which often takes place on its 
own. 
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is to get £4.4 million of the total of about 
£20 million going to the former African areas. 
Land consolidation is not a directly productive 
exercise but it is arguable that it is a precondi-
tion for development, and that the sooner it 
is done the less difficult it will be. It is quite 
possible that while consolidation is necessary 
and beneficial in some areas of Kenya, there 
are others where its introduction would be a 
waste, and there may even be cases where 
it can be shown to have positively harmful 
effects. The Government is probably right 
to concentrate on consolidation in selected 
areas, but it should be careful not to undertake 
consolidation indiscriminately. 
The major agricultural development pro-
grammes include specific programmes for 
individual crops, tea, sugar, pineapples, pas-
sion fruit and wheat, which get £3.2 million; 
an ambitious smallholder credit programme 
involving £4.3 million for 3 per cent (30,000) 
of the farmers in the high-potential areas, "the 
3 per cent comprising moreover, relatively pro-
gressive smallholders who are by definition 
already much better off than the rest" (p. 133); 
a range development programme for the 
pastoral areas; and an irrigation programme, 
mainly the extension and re-organisation of 
existing schemes. Altogether 59 per cent of 
the small-farm development expenditure is 
directly allocable to the high-potential areas, a 
large part of it to the more progressive farmers 
in these areas as well; 12 per cent to the 
pastoral areas in the range development pro-
gramme; and 9 per cent goes on irrigation. 
Of the remaining 20 per cent it is likely that 
a large proportion will go on services to sup-
port the major development schemes. The 
programme is very unequal in its distribution. 
There is some justification for this if it is felt 
that Kenya cannot afford to be egalitarian 
at present, and the bulk of the resources must 
go to areas of high-potential where the returns 
are likely to be high to achieve the greatest 
measures in total production. The major fail-
ure of the agricultural programme is in its 
neglect to the famine problem. The famine 
areas, primarily the marginal agricultural 
areas which are heavily populated, get no 
specific allocation of funds, and there are no 
proposals for the alleviation of their problems. 
The complete lack of any programme for these 
areas suggests either a surprising oversight, 
or an extreme pessimism about the ability to 
do anything to overcome the problems of 
famine. 
The plan emphasises the importance of 
social as well as economic planning at several 
points. Thus: "This strategy in development 
emphasises a social approach to economic 
development . . .," and even "The concern 
with social change and improvement does not 
imply, however, any disregard for the econo-
mic criteria. . . ." This is an understatement. 
The plan is noteworthy for its concentration on 
economic rather than social gains, and neither 
in the overall allocations nor in the proposals 
for detailed projects is there any evidence of 
a social concern. 
Education shows roughly the right 
emphasis on higher levels, and it is to be 
hoped that the political temptation for univer-
sal primary education will be resisted for some 
time to come, given the country's acute short-
age of high-level manpower, and it's relative 
inability to cater for the primary school leavers 
at present. While the overall balance looks 
right, there is clearly room for a much more 
careful exercise relating the country's educa-
tional spending to its economic and social 
needs. Educational policy can have an impor-
tant impact on unemployment, on the skilled 
manpower bottle-neck, and on the social prob-
lems of people who have passed through some 
stage or other of the educational system. 
Health receives less development funds 
than housing, which seems a surprising order 
of priorities, and while health centres are ex-
pected to increase in relation to population in 
the countryside, hospital beds will not keep 
pace. 
It remains to be seen whether Kenya will 
ultimately be more successful than Uganda 
or Tanzania, fulfilling a realistic plan rather 
than falling short of one that is more ambi-
tious. It may be possible for Kenya to be 
more ambitious in future, as confidence in 
development prospects increases, but as it 
stands, Kenya's plan, rightly or wrongly is 
undoubtedly the most cautious of the three. 
